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Economi c Adjustment and Trade Po l jcy Movements 
Among Sub- Sahara African Countries 
Abstract: 
We overview Sub- Sahara Africa's macroeconomic performance that precipitated 
economic liberalization policies. Policies of nine countries are analyzed 
from the perspective of economic growth; especially slow growth in 
agriculture, stagnation in real GDP per capita, unstable real exchange 
rates, high debt to GDP ratios, and low debt service to GDP ratios. 
ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND TRADE POLICY MOVEMENTS 
AMONG SUB- SAHARA AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) emerges by any account as the most economically 
disadvantaged regi on in the world. This study emanates from renewed 
international efforts to seek solutions to the SSA crises (especially in 
agriculture), which peaked during the famines of 1983-85. We present an 
overview of SSA's macroeconomic performance. Some countries share a common 
.institutional framework for external adjustment. Members of the Communaute 
Franciere Africaine (CFA) are unable to devalue their nominal exchange rate for 
macroeconomic adjustment. Others, "non-CFA" countries, are able. Almost a l l of 
these countries are primary product producers, with a small industrial base and a 
service sector fuelled by public expenditures. Only a few are oil export j ng. 
Aside from Congo , a mineral exporter , the highest income SSA countries are 
oil exporters (Table 1). Growth of GNP per capita varies considerably. Cameroon 
(3.9% per year), Congo (3.6%) and Lesotho (5.6%) have experienced rapid growth 
rates due to oil, mineral extraction and links with the South African economy, 
respectively . 
POLICY LIBERALIZATION AND INSTRUMENTS 
There is demonst r able SSA willingness to implement policy changes. Examp les 
are reform programs instituted since 1983 by the World Bank (World Bank, 1981) 
and the Organization of African Unity (OAU , 1980). They recommended reduction of 
barriers to international trade, open market valuation of currency, parastatal 
privatization, open domestic marketing systems and improved production 
technology. By early 1987, about twenty- one SSA countries were undertaking 
structural adjustment either through the World Bank or under the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Both CFA and non- CFA countries are included, although none 
of the CFA oil exporters undertook reforms. This supports Devarajan and de Me lo 
(1987) that membership in the CFA zone does not in principle impede adjustment t o 
2 
macroeconomic imbalances. The most critical policy problems identified by the 
World Bank (1981, 1986) were trade and exchange rate biases against exports, poor 
public sector management and a bias against agriculture. During the 1980s, 
average per capita income in SSA fell by 25 percent. SSA's debt burden reached 
crisis proportions in about one- half of those countries. 
Major policy reforms were geared toward more flexible foreign exchange 
controls. Major currency devaluatjons occured in Ghana, Nigeria, Madagascar, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia. Periodic auction markets have been 
set up (Ghana, Nigeria) and / or debt payments and government purchase of medical 
and educational supplies take place at administered exchange rates (Zambia). 
Exchange rate auctions may be the most important policy instrument (IMF, 1986). 
But their success depends on sufficient monetary and fiscal ·conservatism to 
prevent the erosion of devaluation- induced changes in relative prices. 
Some countries are systematically doing away with government-controlled 
parastatals (Ghana, ~igeria). Others have ended state marketing monopolies. 
They include Niger (CFA), Congo, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and 
Zambia (Non-CFA). Programs to privatize state · investment in agriculture are 
found in Benin and Togo (CFA) and Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone (Non-CFA). 
While it has been difficult to quantify progress, the signals point toward 
progress. Positive adjustments include the lowering of real exchange rates, 
reduction in fiscal deficits and raising of ~xport crop prices. There seems to 
be a correlation between good policy reform results and World Bank support and 
lending (Ghana) . In most adjusting countries, steps have been taken to 
restructure public employment, rationalize and improve management in public 
enterprises, lift price and trade controls both domestically and externally, and 
strengthen government economic management especially through public investment 
programs (World Bank, 1988 p.28). 
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PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
The one indicator which demonstrates the need for policy liberalization is 
productivity growth. CPA oil exporting countries like Cameroon and Cote 
d'Ivoire, in addition to ranking among the highest in per capita GNP, experienced 
high growth rates in agriculture (compared to other SSA countries) between 1965 
and 1980 (Table 1). In the 1980s these rates have been reduced. The discovery 
of oil and the fall in primary commodity prices have contributed to this change. 
Overall, Cameroon experienced higher industrial and service sector growth, a 
result of oil revenues in the 1980s. For Cote d'Ivoire, which depended on cocoa, 
coffee and oil revenues, commodity price falls translated into negative growth in 
the industrial and service sectors. 
Among the non-oil exporting CFA countries, only the Central African 
Republic. Niger and Senegal experienced increased growth rates in agriculture 
during the 1980s as compared to 1965-80. For these co11ntrles. growth was only 
modest in agriculture and negative in the industrial and service sectors. 
After the oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria's agricultural production fell 
through the 1980s. The industrial and service sectors gained in production, in 
part from the transfer of resources from agriculture. Nigeria's economic growth 
was probably checked in the 1980s by low oil prices and poor policy management . 
Results from recent re-adjustment policies have not been realized yet. 
For the non-CFA, non-oil exporting SSA countries, the decline in 
agricultural growth rates continues. Only Zambia and Zimbabwe have experienced 
even modest increases (pre-independence 1980 data on Zimbabwe cannot be used due 
to policy change). Industrial growth rates were high in Congo. Kenya and Liberia 
in the 1965-80 era due to booms in minerals, primary commodities and U.S. aid. 
respectively. But all countries except Congo experienced tremendous declines in 
production in the 1980s. Congo's mineral wealth accounts for its relatively high 
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GNP and growth rates among all sectors. The high amount of foreign aid that 
reached Ethiopia and Somalia has accounted for the rapid industrial growth rates 
observed in these countries. Aside from Ghana and Uganda, countries embarked on 
strong economic re-adjustment and civil war, the service sector's productivity 
rate fell for all countries in this group. 
There is a recognizable relationship between low economic growth rates and 
the response to policy liberalization among SSA countries. None of the CFA oil 
exporting countries (which demonstrate relatively strong economic growth rates) 
have embarked on meaningful economic re-adjustment. Only Cameroon has initiated 
an economic stabilization program for 1988/89 by accepting a CFA $20 billion loan 
from the French Fund for Economic Co-operation (CCCE). 
Among the CFA non - oil exporting countries, only Burkina Faso, Rwanda and 
Senegal have not embarked on some restructuring. For the non~CFA countries, 
Angola, Botswana. Ethiopia. Guinea-Bissau , Lesotho, Liberia. Mozambique, Uganda, 
Zaire and Zimbabwe are not implementing policy liberalization. Of these, Angola , 
Ethiopia, and Mozambique are involved in civil war . 
AN.t\J~YTJ.f~.1_ FRAMEWORK 
Domestic economic policy linkages are an~lyzed from the perspective of 
economic growth rates , specifically the slow growth in agric~ltural exports and 
the rapidly increasing agricultural imports as financial situations worsen . We 
investigate the terms of trade of selected SSA countries as related to 
agricultural export and import volumes. We have already demonstrated 
agriculture's importance to GOP. We establish a uniform base for stylized 
comparison among all SSA countries in terms of the crisis facing agriculture. 
We investigate the extent to which real GDP per capita (as a proxy fo r real 
income) has stagnated . We analyze movements within countries of the real 
exchange rate. Real exchange rate is defined as the nominal exchange rate times 
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a world price index divided by a domest i c pr i ce index (Williamson 1985). The 
total debt of SSA countries in terms of their GDP and the total debt service to 
GDP ratio are also analyzed. The purpose is to f i nd to what extent sectoral 
policies have been effected for economic growth. The total debt facing a 
country, as a percentage of its GDP, determines its external financial 
obligations and the net liquidity available for other domestic activities . 
Any researcher of the SSA region is confronted with gaps in the offici a l 
statistics. Some countries do not have published national data for all years. 
There are conceptual problems in converting data from different countries into 
single economic growth rates for a group of countries . We use secondary data 
from the tapes of the World Bank (total debt, total debt service , nominal GDP in 
local currency, population, nominal exchange rates, consumer price index) and the 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN (agricultural imports and exports). 
ANALYSIS 
Nine countries (Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire. Gabon, Senegal, Nigeria, Congo, 
Ghana , Kenya and Zimbabwe) were selected for further analysis . Cameroon, Cote 
d'Ivoire , Gabon (CFA) , Ghana , Nigeria and Zimbabwe (Non- CFA) accounted for 46% of 
total agricultural exports in 1980 and 1986. Gabon is the smallest exporter of 
agricultural products. Only Ghana and Zimbabwe are not oil exporters. Seven 
countries (Angola, Ethiopia , Cote h1 Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Zaire) 
were importing over $200 million each by 1986 , led by Nigerta. 
The oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 1979 resulted in large transfers of 
wealth especially to Nigeria (Non-CFA, oil exporting). Nigeria's public 
expenditures increased tremendously, as did the country's access to international 
capital markets. Agriculture, the main nonoil tractable sector, fell. Pinto 
(1987) showed that, in terms of export diversification, the share of oil in 
Nigeria's overall exports has been about 90% since 1974. Nigeria is a large 
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agricultural importer, which may be attributed to its large population (about 120 
millions) and low agricultural productivity. Declining oil revenues and attempts 
at economic restructuring forced Nigeria to cut imports between 1981 amd 86. 
Most of these countries experienced windfall gains from the commodity price 
increases of the rnid-1970s. Cameroon, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire benefited from the 
coffee and cocoa boom of 1975-77. For these countries, agricultural exports have 
accounted systematically for over 50% of total exports. The boom, coupled with 
repressed producer prices, created a one-time opportunity for governments' 
current account balances to rise. In Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire, this was 
assisted by the discovery of oil; and in 1985-86, by the decline in Brazilian 
coffee production. SSA's share of world coffee production rose to 27-28% as 
compared to the average of 23% during 1977-81 (USDA, 1987). Zimbabwe's 
agricultural exports are led by cotton and corn. 
Where oil's share of GDP has been high (Nigeria, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire), in 
all years except those immediately following the two oil shocks, domestic 
spending rose more than real GDP, and probably than national disposable income. 
This was reflected in the high relative total debt to GDP ratios (Fig. 1) for 
those countries by 1986. In Senegal, following the phosphates boom in 1973-75, 
and the droughts of 1977-78 and 1979-80, government policies led to an increasing 
debt to GDP ratio that has not been arrested in the 1980s. The Senegalese 
government has favored expansionary fiscal policy in maintaining private 
consumption and expanding public consumption. For Ghana, the total debt to GDP 
ratio was substantially lower, but Ghana's debt began to increase with the 1983 
IMF-World Bank led economic revitalization program. Cameroon's borrowing 
strategy was more conservative. The debt ratio for most countries rose steadily 
throughout the 1970s, in part from the large surplus financial capital that was 
available in the form of petro-dollars. However. after the 1982 oil price 
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decline, all the listed oil exporters increased their foreign borrowing 
significantly. 
Adjustment policy differences abound. The CFA oil exporting countries 
(Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon) consistently serviced their debts at higher 
rates in the 1970s than in the 1980s. Debt servicing fell after 1981 for Cote 
d'Ivoire. While Cameroon used oil revenues to retire part of its foreign debt, 
Nigeria (Non- CFA) did not. A final consideration is the ability of countries 
with high debts to repay, especially when caught in a high real interest rate-low 
oil price squeeze. Some countries (e.g., Nigeria) have reached the limit of 
their debt-carrying capacity . If government spending is not curtailed, inflation 
rates will accelerate. Seigniorage to finance deficits will result. 
It is SSA's debt - servicing difficulties that continue to threaten economic 
recovery. According to the African Development Bank (ADB) , Africa's external 
debt has grown steeply in recent years to an estimated $218.1 billion in 1987, 
against $187.2 billion in 1986--abQut 54.2% of which is owed by SSA (West African 
Magazine, 1988). In absolute terms Africa is the least indebted of the 
continents. It is the size of its debt obligation relative to available 
resources that makes it critical. 
The GDP per capita (Fig. 2) reflects the consequences of excessive spending 
practices. Following the initial oil shocks of the early 1970s, GDP per capita 
continued to increase for the oil exporting countries (Cameroon, Gabon, Cote 
d'Ivoire and Nigeria). Apart from Cameroon, all countries showed a decline in 
GDP per capita after the oil price decline of the early 1980s and the lower 
production limit agreed to by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
For Ghana, growth was steady at best. Ghana's 1986 gross national product 
(GNP) of $390 places it slightly below the middle-income economies. The spurious 
rise in real GDP between 1979-82 may be attributed largely to large foreign 
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remittances from Ghanaians abroad and the absence of inflationary adjustment. 
The picture contradicts the recession that faced Ghana from 1979 through 1983, 
and which triggered a World Bank-IMF Jed adjustment program. Short-run results 
of Ghana's adjustment policies have been very impressive and the World Bank is 
touting it as a model for SSA economic development. 
What sets CFA zone members apart from all others are monetary integration, 
currency convertibility and a fixed exchange rate. As can bP. seen from Fig. 3, 
real exchange rate movements, though different in magnitude, have followed 
similar trends for the selected CFA zone countries. Generally, all the countries 
experienced currency depreciation from 1971 through 1980. But the rate of 
depreciation slowed after the coffee and cocoa boom of 1976-77 and the post-1978 
oil boom for Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire. We also need to account for the 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar which started in the fourth quarter of 1980, 
since we indexed our calculations with the U.S. CPI. All the countries 
experienced currency appreciation until 1985, followed by a quick drop in 1986. 
Since most countries face different macroeconomic difficulties, unique paths 
toward adjustment are required. For instance, Cote d'Ivoire is faced with 
massive deficit which requires servicing soon. Cameroon , on the contrary, has 
been running sizable current account surpluses. 
The Cameroonian government used its liquid position to raise producer prices 
of cash crops, thus keeping the real exchange rate from highly appreciating 
relative to all other CFA countries. In addition, a well-documented bias of the 
public expenditure mix toward investment rather than consumption has been 
enacted. Cote d'Ivoire, on the contrary, accelerated public investment, begun in 
1974, in large projects with high unit costs, long gestation lags and low foreign 
exchange earnings potential. This highlights some of the problems facing the CFA 
zone , and which calls for monetary integration . 
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For all other SSA countries, adjustable peg exchange rate policies have been 
supported through reserve intervention. Notable among them is Nigeria, in which 
private sector excess demand at the official rate was satisfied through reserve 
depletion before 1981 . The government, reluctant to adopt more flexible rates. 
began rationing the official exchange through an import licensing scheme. The 
post oil-price decrease of 1982 has exacerbated the situation. It is not known 
if the small exchange rate rise in 1986 can be sustained. If liquid assets 
acquire option values , and without credible reforms, capital flight and probably 
a higher black market premium may result. 
In Ghana , foreign reserves were unavailable to finance the official rate. 
The resultant premium on foreign exchange provided an incentive for the emergence 
of parallel markets. Subsequently, exports and imports went through the parallel 
market as well. Until 1983 , when adjustment started taking hold in Ghana, the 
real exchange rate depreciated (Fig. 4). Rapid depreciation and inflation placed 
a constraint on imports. Necessary technological transfer and capital goods 
needed for economic growth were unavailable . 
The real exchange rate for Kenya has been almost uniformly high throughout 
the study period. Ra t es for Zimbabwe and Zambia were uniformly low. 
fONCLUS I_9N 
Obviously, SSA's peculiar economic problems must be of poignant concern.' We 
have used various economic indicators to show SSA's agricultural trade, 
macroeconomic policies and economic growth linkages. We have noted the 
performance of selected countries using different macroeconomic instruments. The 
responses toward Western- style economic adjustment have been vastly different and 
sometimes slow . SSA has not been able to take advantage of the burgeoning world 
markets . 
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Most countries with high GNP are oil exporters (Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Gabon, Nigeria) or mineral exporters (Congo). Among those, the majority belong 
to the CFA zone. Even with its lower contribution to GDP, the agricultural GDP 
per capita in those countries with high GNP tends to be higher than that for the 
lower income countries (except for Nigeria). This js reflected in productivity 
growth for agriculture. 
Except for Cameroon which recently adopted policy liberalization, other CFA 
oil exporting countries have not begun using economic re-adjustment tools. Even 
thou~h they face some of the highest debt rates, these countries demonstrate the 
economic potential to provide attractive markets for expanded agricultural 
imports. Institutional corlstraints (such as foreign exchange rates) provide 
notable hurdles toward market integration. 
For all other groups of countries, it is still too early to tell if 
instituted policy liberalization measures will achieve the desired long-term 
diversjfication needed for the region to become competitive on the world market. 
Recognizable common features among all non-oil exporting countries are low per 
capita GNP or GDP. relativeJy low agricultural productivity, but relatively lower 
debt to GDP ratios and lower debt service to GDP ratios. Major differences arise 
from the exchange rate poJi c ies of the CFA group relative to all others. Future 
adjustment policies for the CFA zone need to take stock of monetary integration. 
Otherwise, prospects for independent economic growth and hence the enhancement of 
tools to satisfy demand structures is dim. 
. ' 
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Table 1 Institutional Classification of Sub-Sahara African Countries 
GNp ______ p_~~·- __ _Q_~Qi ta ____ ·-- .~vei:-i!Z~ ___ t\!lm•~.LJ~_rg~u-~tl_Q!l_Qro~!.h_B_9_!_~~ _l~_ 
Annual Growth 
Rates ( % ) _ AgrjcuLt!ff~----- ____ !_!!._tj_tg:>J.:.!:~--~---~-~rvi_~s 
Country Dollars 1986 1965-86 1965-80 1980- 86 1965- 80 1980- 86 1965-80 1980- 86 
CFA Oil Exporting 
Cameroon 910 3.9 
1.2 
1.9 
Cote d'Ivoire 730 
Gabon 3080 
CFA Non-Oil Exporting 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Central Afr. Rep. 
Chad 
Guinea 
Mali 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Togo 
Non-CFA Oil Exporting 
Angola 
270 
150 
0.2 
1.3 
240 1-8 
290 - 0.6 
180 1.1 
260 -2.2 
290 1 . 5 
420 -0.6 
250 0 . 2 
Nigeria 640 1.9 
Non-CFA Non- Oil Exporting 
Botswana 
Congo 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Mozambique 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
data not a~ailable 
990 3.6 
120 0.0 
390 - 1. 7 
300 1.9 
370 5.6 
460 - 1.4 
230 -1.7 
210 
310 0.2 
280 - 0.3 
320 -0.2 
250 - 0.3 
230 -2.6 
160 - 2.2 
300 - 1.7 
620 1.2 
4.2 
3.3 
3.3 
2.1 
2.8 
-3.4 
1.4 
1. 9 
1.7 
3.1 
1. 2 
1. 6 
5.5 
2.3 
2.9 
1. 6 
1. 2 
2.2 
2.0 
0.9 
3.0 
2.7 
1. 3 
2.5 
0.3 
-2.3 
2.8 
0.9 
2.3 
1. 7 
1.4 
- 0.6 
- 3.9 
- 0.2 
2.8 
1.6 
1.2 
2.1 
-15.9 
0.5 
7.9 
0.4 
0.8 
- 0.1 
1.7 
2.8 
3.4 
Source : World Bank, World __ Development Report. 1988. 
8.1 
10.4 
7.8 
5.3 
4.2 
11. 4 
4.8 
6.8 
13.4 
10.3 
3.5 
1.4 
9.8 
2.2 
-1. 0 
3.1 
4.2 
-4.1 
2.8 
15.9 
- 1.9 
10.2 
2.1 
4.9 
1. 7 
0.1 
4.0 
-4.3 
4.8 
4.0 
- 2.2 
-5.1 
8.4 
3.8 
- 2.4 
2.7 
- 3.9 
- 6.0 
- 3.6 
-13 .3 
- 2.4 
- 5.1 
2.1 
-4 .5 
0.9 
2.7 
2.1 
0.8 
4.8 
9.4 
2.7 
2.0 
7.0 
3.4 
1.3 
5.4 
8.8 
4.7 
5.2 
1.1 
6.4 
2 .4 . 
5.8 
4.9 
6.9 
1.1 
7.0 
-0.5 
1. 8 
2.4 
3.2 
--0. 5 
2 . 1 
3_8 
- 8.0 
1.1 
3.2 
-2.3 
-4.0 
3.7 
5.1 
3.3 
4.2 
2.7 
- 0.8 
- 0.7 
0.2 
1.5 
3.6 
- 0.3 
2.9 
3.3 
-0.7 
-- 0. 7 
3.7 
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